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Christopher Ford just spoke about compliance assessment and compliance
enforcement, which are two concepts very inter-related and essential to non-
proliferation. I will too focus my presentation today on compliance, but more
specifically on its linkage with verification, another important element in non-
proliferation. The Concise Oxford Dictionary describes compliance as the
"action in accordance with request, command, etc."' Compliance with non-
proliferation obligations could then be understood as either a result of a threat
of retaliation by others, or deriving from a voluntary decision to enter into such
obligations.
The first type of compliance was most recently experienced in 1991 when
the Security Council imposed stringent disarmament obligations on Iraq,
threatening "grave consequences" in case of non-compliance (and "grave
consequences" in the diplomatic lingo means "military attacks"). The
inspections, therefore, implemented in Iraq from 1991 to 1998 and from
November 2002 to March 2003, were extremely intrusive and unrestricted.
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They inspected any place, any time, anywhere in Iraq, and they had access to
any Iraqi official or scientists deemed relevant for verification purposes.
But most of the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
obligations entered into by countries fall in the second category: voluntary
agreements by which governments decide to accept certain restrictions under
the expectation to benefit from joining those regimes.
In both cases, the third parties (the Security Council in the case of Iraq; the
other states parties to the treaties in the case of voluntary agreements) see it as
fundamental to ascertain whether the other governments are fulfilling their
obligations. One important and common tool to ascertain compliance is
through a "verification regime." Thus, verification is the action to prove either
compliance or non-compliance with non-proliferation agreements. The whole
purpose of verification is to build confidence. In cases where proliferation
concerns exist, states are demanded to be more open and transparent. Even if
such measures go beyond a state's legal obligations, they pay valuable
dividends in restoring the confidence of the international community.
Verification also serves as deterrence due to the risk of detection of
proscribed activities. For example, we now know that in July 1991 the Iraqi
regime decided to destroy, unilaterally and in secret, its clandestine missile
force to avoid being caught cheating by the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM).
Verification is not a rewarding activity-it goes unnoticed until something
goes wrong. Verification is also not a perfect system, as its results depend on
many technical, legal and most importantly, political factors. Moreover,
verification is but one part of the non-proliferation regime. For the regime as
a whole to function effectively, we must ensure not only effective verification
but also effective export controls, effective physical protection of nuclear
material and effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of non-compliance.
It is imperative that these components are well integrated.
The effectiveness of a verification system depends on four elements:
a) Adequate legal authority;
b) Timely access to information;
c) Timely access to locations and people for interviews; and
d) Availability of state-of-the-art verification technology and the
right to use it.
There are many versions of verification as there are many arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. The most common type of
verification is the so-called "permissive regime," such as the International
Atomic Energy Agency's (LAEA) or Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapon's (OPCW), as it is based on a voluntary acceptance by the
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governments to be verified by external bodies. This type of verification in
general has a limited legal scope, which reduces the actual inspection activities
to certain types of materials and locations clearly defined by the agreements.
Consequently, the assurances provided by this kind of verification are also
limited. Still, they have proved to be an important tool for the international
community. Without them, each individual state party to a multilateral
disarmament or non-proliferation agreement would have to make its own
assessment about the other parties' compliance with their obligations.
Over the past years, the IAEA has clearly made progress on some fronts
in the verification area, but perhaps regressed on others. The IAEA's
resumption of inspections in Iraq in 2002, the termination of inspections in
North Korea, our investigation of clandestine nuclear programmes in Libya and
Iran, the discovery of illicit nuclear procurement networks and the lack of
agreement at the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference have put the spotlight on an unprecedented array of challenges to
the non-proliferation and arms control regime.
The IAEA's verification system has shown great resourcefulness and
resiliency in dealing with many of these challenges. We have rapidly initiated
intensive verification efforts in a number of countries and investigated the illicit
procurement network. We have strengthened the verification system through
enhanced use of satellite imagery, environmental sampling and a variety of new
technologies-well as through the development of enhanced information
analysis techniques, the introduction of integrated safeguards, and the transition
towards a more qualitative, information based system. And perhaps most
importantly, in dealing with these verification challenges, we have maintained
our objectivity and independence, and thereby strengthened our credibility. In
short, the past few years have continued to underscore the central importance
of the IAEA' s role in combating proliferation.
Let me now address two specific non-proliferation challenges and the
verification activities conducted by the IAEA.
I. NORTH KOREA
Since 1993, the IAEA has been unable to fully implement its NPT
safeguards agreement with North Korea. After an extended period of non-
compliance with that agreement, in December 2002 North Korea asked IAEA
inspectors to leave the country and a few weeks later declared its withdrawal
from the NPT. Since that time, the IAEA has not been permitted to perform any
verification activities in North Korea, and therefore, cannot provide any level
of assurance about North Korea's nuclear activities.
The IAEA remains ready to work with all parties towards a comprehensive
settlement that would both address the security needs of North Korea and
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provide assurance to the international community that all nuclear activities in
that country are exclusively for peaceful purposes. The agreement reached in
Beijing at the six-party talks-after two years of complex negotiations--on the
principles that should govern a comprehensive settlement, is a significant step
forward. It is particularly welcome that North Korea has expressed its
commitment "to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs
and [to return], at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards." 2
This past September the TAEA Board of Governors expressed the view that
a successfully negotiated settlement of this longstanding issue of maintaining
the essential verification role of the IAEA would be a significant
accomplishment for international peace and security.
II. IRAN
For the past two and a half years, the IAEA has been investigating the
nature and extent of Iran's nuclear program, with a view to assuring ourselves
that all past activities have been declared to the IAEA, and that all nuclear
material and activities in the country are under safeguards. Iran has failed in a
number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear
material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities where
such material had been processed and stored.
Since October 2003, however, Iran has made good progress in correcting
its past breaches and the IAEA has been able to verify certain aspects of Iran's
nuclear program. As a result, some aspects of that program-such as those
related to uranium conversion, laser enrichment, fuel fabrication and heavy
water-are now being followed up as routine safeguards implementation
matters.
Since last November, our verification efforts have focused primarily on
two aspects of Iran's centrifuge enrichment activities. Regarding the first
aspect, the origin of uranium particle contamination found at various locations
in Iran, we have made good progress, with the active cooperation of Pakistan.
Regarding the second aspect, clarifying the chronology of Iran's centrifuge
activities, we still have a number of unanswered questions and we have made
repeated requests to Iran for additional information and access.
As our latest report in September made clear, Iran continues to fulfill its
obligations under the safeguards agreement and additional protocol by
providing timely access to nuclear material, facilities and other locations. This,
2. Christopher R. Hill, Asst. Sec. for East Asian& Pac. Aff. (U.S. Dept. of State), Statement before
the House International Relations Committee (Oct. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rmV2005/54430.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
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however, is a special verification case that requires additional transparency
measures as a prerequisite for the IAEA to be able to reconstruct the history and
nature of all aspects of Iran's past nuclear activities, and to compensate for the
confidence deficit created. By promptly responding to these IAEA requests,
Iran would well serve both its interests and those of the international
community. The more thoroughly we are able to clarify all of Iran's past
nuclear activities, the more we will be in a position to understand and confih'm
the nature of the program.
As a confidence building measure, the Board has also, in a number of
resolutions beginning in December 2003, urged Iran to maintain a voluntary
suspension of all its enrichment related and reprocessing activities and has
asked the IAEA to continue to monitor Iran's application of this suspension.
Since August 8, Iran has been conducting conversion activities at the Isfahan
Uranium Conversion Facility under IAEA verification. Other aspects of Iran's
suspension remain intact.
The IAEA Board of Governors has continued to devote considerable
attention to the implementation of Iran's NPT safeguards agreement. Last
month the Board adopted a resolution that, inter alia, found Iran to be in
noncompliance with its safeguards agreement and urged Iran to implement the
transparency measures necessary for the IAEA to be able to clarify outstanding
issues. The IAEA will continue to call on Iran to do its utmost to work with the
IAEA and the international community, to provide assurance that its nuclear
program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.
III. NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
Countries with nuclear industries have set up elaborate accounting and
protection measures to ensure strong national oversight of their nuclear
material. The IAEA inspects regularly to verify the accuracy of what countries
report. Export controls restrict the transfer of sensitive technologies that could
be misused for nuclear-weapons production.
However, controlling access to nuclear-weapons technology has grown
increasingly difficult. The technical barriers to designing weapons and to
mastering the processing steps have eroded with time. Much of the hardware
in question is "dual-use;" for example, it is hard to justify restrictions on
exporting "hot cell" technology that could be used for plutonium separation
when the same equipment is vital for producing radioisotopes used in modern
medicine. Changes in political fortunes or economic downturns have at times
found nuclear scientists without jobs and reportedly willing to offer their
knowledge and services elsewhere. And with the passage of time, the sheer
diversity of technology has made it harder to control both procurement and
sales. In pre-1991 Iraq, for example, scientists were simultaneously pursuing
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no fewer than six different technologies to enrich uranium for eventual weapons
use, shopping for essential equipment and specialized materials in more than
ten countries.
Uranium enrichment is sophisticated and expensive, but it is not
proscribed under the NPT. Most designs for civilian nuclear-power reactors
require fuel that has been "low-enriched," and many research reactors operate
with "high-enriched" uranium. It is not uncommon, therefore, for non-nuclear-
weapon states with developed nuclear infrastructures to seek enrichment
capabilities and to possess sizeable amounts of uranium that could, if desired,
be enriched to weapons-grade.
While high-enriched uranium is easier to use in nuclear weapons, most
advanced nuclear arsenals favor plutonium, which can be tailored for use in
smaller, lighter weapons more suited for missile warheads. Plutonium is a by-
product of nuclear-reactor operation and separation technology ("reproces-
sing"), also not proscribed under the NPT, can be applied to extract the
plutonium from spent fuel for re-use in electricity production.
Under the current NPT regime, therefore, there is nothing illicit in a non-
nuclear-weapon state having enrichment or reprocessing technology, or
possessing weapon-grade nuclear material. And certain types of bomb-making
expertise, unfortunately, are readily available in the open literature. Should a
state with a fully developed fuel-cycle capability decide, for whatever reason,
to break away from its non-proliferation commitments, most experts believe it
could produce a nuclear weapon within a matter of months.
In 1970, it was assumed that relatively few countries knew how to acquire
nuclear weapons. Now, with thirty five to forty countries in the know by some
estimates, the margin of security under the current non-proliferation regime is
becoming too slim for comfort. We need a new approach.
Several proposals have been floated in the past two years, including one
by President Bush, to restrict the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
facilities and technologies. However, countries with the potential to develop
such technologies, in particular developing countries, are opposed to any further
restriction. It is in that context that the Director General has presented his
proposal for a Multinational Approach to the nuclear fuel cycle.
In 2004, the Director General established a group of senior experts to
explore options for multilateral control of fuel cycle facilities. In February
2005, the expert group issued its report, and the Director General has been
encouraged by the range of supporting initiatives that have followed. The
uranium industry and the World Nuclear Association have set up a working
group to explore the concept of fuel assurances. The United States has been
developing a proposal on providing "reliable access to nuclear fuel," working
with principal suppliers, for states that agree to forego independent enrichment
Zlauvinen
and reprocessing facilities. And the Nuclear Threat Initiative is working on a
strategy that would help the IAEA set up an actual fuel bank.
In addition, with spent nuclear fuel stored in temporary sites in more than
fifty countries, many without the proper geology for underground disposal,
multilateral approaches to spent fuel management and disposal could be a
solution for the future. In July in Moscow, at an international conference
organized by the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (ROSATOM) in cooperation
with the IAEA, considerable discussion took place on possibilities related to
multilateral fuel storage and disposal, as well as fuel leasing or even full service
nuclear leasing.
We should be clear that there is no incompatibility between tightening
controls over the nuclear fuel cycle and expanding the use of peaceful nuclear
technologies. In fact, by reducing the risks of proliferation we could pave the
way for more widespread use of peaceful nuclear applications.
IV. NUCLEAR TERRORISM
The security of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated
technologies has taken on heightened significance in recent years. The IAEA
has been active in the field of nuclear security for many years, but the events
of September 2001 propelled the rapid and dramatic re-evaluation of the risks
of terrorism in all its forms-whether related to the security of urban centers,
oil refineries, air and rail travel, or activities involving nuclear and radiological
material. Terrorist attacks since that time have continued to keep these
concerns in the forefront of our collective consciousness. It has become
obvious that our work to strengthen nuclear security is both vital and urgent and
that we must not wait for a "watershed" nuclear security event to provide the
needed security upgrades.
Effective and credible approaches to nuclear security are essential not only
for detecting and responding to illicit trafficking, but also for the protection of
nuclear power plants, research reactors and the array of nuclear and other
radioactive materials that support these and other nuclear applications. To
optimize the effectiveness of these efforts, it is important to prioritize-to focus
on those facilities and activities where the risk is greatest-and to maintain a
balance between security needs and the many benefits of peaceful applications
of nuclear technology.
International cooperation has become the hallmark of these security
efforts. While nuclear security is and should remain a national responsibility,
some countries still lack the programmes and the resources to respond properly
to the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. For these countries,
international cooperation is essential to help them strengthen their national
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capacities. International cooperation is also essential to our efforts to build
regional and global networks for combating transnational threats.
In that context, the IAEA has established a nuclear security plan to help
states to improve their national capacities to guard against thefts of nuclear and
other radioactive material and to protect related facilities against malicious acts.
Important progress has been achieved in the last few years in increasing the
governments' awareness of the potential risk of nuclear terrorism. But much
remains to be implemented. International cooperation in this fight is essential,
as the system is as strong as its weakest link. Loose controls in one country
could mean safe passage or ground for a terrorist organization to acquire, plan
and launch a nuclear or radiological attack to another country. And the
consequences to the population and the environment in such an attack would
not only be suffered by the country under attack, but also by its neighbors.
After all, we are all on the same side in this fight.
